eprintid: 24404 rev_number: 20 userid: 4439 dir: disk0/00/02/44/04 datestamp: 2015-05-07 19:27:34 lastmod: 2019-02-02 16:57:19 status_changed: 2015-05-07 19:27:34 type: article metadata_visibility: show contact_email: donburke@pitt.edu item_issues_count: 0 eprint_status: archive creators_name: Shim, E creators_name: Grefenstette, JJ creators_name: Albert, SM creators_name: Cakouros, BE creators_name: Burke, DS creators_email: creators_email: gref@pitt.edu creators_email: smalbert@pitt.edu creators_email: creators_email: donburke@pitt.edu creators_id: creators_id: GREF creators_id: SMALBERT creators_id: creators_id: DONBURKE creators_orcid: creators_orcid: creators_orcid: 0000-0001-6786-9956 creators_orcid: creators_orcid: title: A game dynamic model for vaccine skeptics and vaccine believers: Measles as an example ispublished: pub divisions: sch_gsph_behavioralcommhealthsci divisions: sch_gsph_biostatistics divisions: sch_gsph_epidemiology full_text_status: public abstract: Widespread avoidance of Measles-Mumps-Rubella vaccination (MMR), with a consequent increase in the incidence of major measles outbreaks, demonstrates that the effectiveness of vaccination programs can be thwarted by the public misperceptions of vaccine risk. By coupling game theory and epidemic models, we examine vaccination choice among populations stratified into two behavioral groups: vaccine skeptics and vaccine believers. The two behavioral groups are assumed to be heterogeneous with respect to their perceptions of vaccine and infection risks. We demonstrate that the pursuit of self-interest among vaccine skeptics often leads to vaccination levels that are suboptimal for a population, even if complete coverage is achieved among vaccine believers. The demand for measles vaccine across populations driven by individual self-interest was found to be more sensitive to the proportion of vaccine skeptics than to the extent to which vaccine skeptics misperceive the risk of vaccine. Furthermore, as the number of vaccine skeptics increases, the probability of infection among vaccine skeptics increases initially, but it decreases once the vaccine skeptics begin receiving the vaccination, if both behavioral groups are vaccinated according to individual self-interest. Our results show that the discrepancy between the coverages of measles vaccine that are driven by self-interest and those driven by population interest becomes larger when the cost of vaccination increases. This research illustrates the importance of public education on vaccine safety and infection risk in order to maintain vaccination levels that are sufficient to maintain herd immunity. © 2011 Elsevier Ltd. date: 2012-02-21 date_type: published publication: Journal of Theoretical Biology volume: 295 pagerange: 194 - 203 refereed: TRUE issn: 0022-5193 centers: cen_other_vaccineresearch id_number: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2011.11.005 citation: Shim, E and Grefenstette, JJ and Albert, SM and Cakouros, BE and Burke, DS (2012) A game dynamic model for vaccine skeptics and vaccine believers: Measles as an example. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 295. 194 - 203. ISSN 0022-5193 document_url: http://d-scholarship-dev.library.pitt.edu/24404/1/licence.txt